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AUTHOR’S MAIN MESSAGE
Trade policy is not an employment policy and should not be expected to have major effects on overall employment. 
When it does so, it is because it interacts with distortions in labor markets, which vary from country to country and 
time to time. No generalization is feasible, and seeking to make one is pretty much a fool’s errand. Policymakers 
wanting to boost employment should think about the aggregate economic balance and labor market institutions, 
and not interfere with international trade.
Cons
 Through its effects on the rest of the economy, the 
protection of one sector reduces the jobs available 
in other, export-oriented, sectors.
 In the long term, trade liberalizations can boost 
employment and, other things being equal, more 
open economies have higher levels of employment.
 Trade reform is frequently associated with an 
increase in the number of “better” jobs.
 Trade reform may cause intrasectoral reallocation 
from less to more efficient firms within sectors.
Pros
 Protecting import-competing sectors can increase 
the number of jobs they offer or at least reduce 
the rate of decline.
 Labor market adjustment to a trade reform is 
slow, so there may be costs to liberalization in the 
short and medium terms.
 A trade liberalization may cause a shift from 
formal to informal employment, which is often 
held to be inferior.
ELEVATOR PITCH 
Trade regulation can create jobs in the sectors it 
protects or promotes, but almost always at the 
expense of destroying a roughly equivalent number of 
jobs elsewhere in the economy. At a product-specific 
or micro level and in the short term, controlling trade 
could reduce the offending imports and save jobs, but 
for the economy as a whole and in the long term, this 
has neither theoretical support nor evidence in its favor. 
Given that protection may have other—usually adverse—
effects, understanding the difficulties in using it to 
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MOTIVATION 
Imports cause job losses in import-competing sectors. They affect the labor market 
unevenly, across sectors and geographic areas and, because labor mobility is limited, 
the adjustment process may be very slow. Curtailing imports to preserve jobs seems 
attractive politics, because it can be presented as politicians protecting (note the word) 
their constituents from harm produced by adverse foreign forces over which they have no 
control. This is all very well, but it ignores the effect that protecting Paul has on Peter’s 
ability to earn a living. Through a variety of well-understood mechanisms, protecting 
some sectors typically harms others and destroys jobs in those other sectors, with the 
result that one ends up with a distorted economy but little change in overall employment. 
DISCUSSION OF PROS AND CONS 
In the simplest versions of the currently prevailing neoclassical model of the economy, 
long-term levels of employment and unemployment are determined by macroeconomic 
variables and labor market institutions, not by trade and not at all by trade policy. So, 
according to this view, trade policy can have no long-term impact on employment levels. 
Even neoclassicists, however, recognize that, in the short term, the level of economic activity 
may be influenced by trade shocks or trade policy changes; they argue, however, that in the 
absence of other changes, employment will eventually return to its former equilibrium. 
The structuralist school, by contrast, rejects Say’s Law that demand expands to absorb 
supply, and postulates that trade and trade policy shocks can affect employment 
permanently by creating or destroying jobs with little or no adjustment in the sectors and 
the regions of the economy not directly affected by the shock [1]. 
The difference in approach reflects the specific simplifications in different modeling 
strategies, which in turn stem from different perceptions about the speed of adjustment, 
the type of frictions slowing down the adjustment, and the appropriate time period to 
analyze. Neoclassical theory focuses on the longer term. Structuralist theory focuses on 
Say’s Law
Say’s Law is attributed to the French economist Jean-Baptiste Say, who wrote, in A Treatise 
on Political Economy, 1834, “[a] product is no sooner created, than it, from that instant, 
affords a market for other products to the full extent of its own value.” The idea is simply 
that if a product worth $x is produced, a flow of $x revenue is generated. (That is, the 
value is defined by the flow it generates.) That part of the flow which is spent on inputs 
that are purchased for the purpose of production, represents a direct demand, and that 
which is not is paid to the various factors of production (land, labor, capital, taxes) as 
income. Since income is for spending, these people will demand goods and services from 
others of that value and so ultimately all $x is reflected in demand. 
The term “Say’s Law” was coined by John Maynard Keynes who summarized it as saying 
“supply creates its own demand” and then challenged it on the grounds that income may be 
saved and this not enter demand. Those who adhere to the Law, however, would argue that 
savings get re-directed into investment and that eventually even hoarded money gets spent. 
Say, J.-B. A Treatise on Political Economy: Or the Production, Distribution, and Consumption of 
Wealth. Grigg and Elliot, 1834. 
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time periods short enough that full adjustment has not occurred and is a reminder that, 
certainly for the people affected, the adjustment path can be sufficiently long and painful 
to dominate their view of appropriate trade policy.
In fact, the dichotomy need not be as extreme as the previous paragraphs suggest. 
Theorists have modified the neoclassical model to add in the sort of labor market 
imperfections that create unemployment even in equilibrium. Introducing efficiency wages 
and job searches into trade models can lead to multiple equilibria, and predictions about 
both (un)employment and the welfare effects of trade liberalization become qualitatively 
ambiguous [2]. In partial empirical support of more general specifications of the trade 
model, labor turnover and attitudes toward trade liberalization are consistent with the 
existence of these sorts of frictions over significant periods of time. 
Unfortunately the heterogeneity of economies and the difficulties of isolating trade policy 
from other policies and from the influence of labor market outcomes make simple statistical 
tests between these two views impossible. So, that leaves partial and approximate results, 
which in turn leave a great deal of room for judgment by policymakers. 
Aggregate employment
The more direct evidence, based on panel data, shows that when trade is driven 
primarily by Ricardian comparative advantage (based on technological differences 
between countries), protection increases unemployment rates across countries [3]. 
Several permanent trade liberalizations reveal a striking difference in the short-term and 
long-term responsiveness of unemployment to trade liberalization. While the immediate 
effect of reducing trade barriers tends to be a rise in unemployment, the longer term sees 
the reversal of this rise and an eventual decline in unemployment. That is, adjustment 
takes time but, at least in this dimension, offers positive returns in the long term.
Where trade is determined more by differences in factor endowments (the Heckscher–
Ohlin framework) than by differences in technology, standard international trade theory 
predicts that in capital-abundant countries trade liberalization will boost the returns to 
capital and (in the simplest form of the model) absolutely reduce those to labor (the 
Stolper–Samuelson theorem). If job search frictions are added to the labor market, that 
also produces higher unemployment. In labor-abundant economies, labor is the winner 
from trade liberalization, and the result would be lower unemployment. There is weak 
evidence for these outcomes, but it is dominated by the results in the previous paragraph. 
The pressure to use trade policy to support employment is probably strongest in developed 
countries, such as those of Europe, and the US. Although trade policy in these economies 
is of a sectoral nature (using sector-specific trade policies to support employment in, say, 
agriculture, steel, or textiles), the evidence from capital-abundant countries hints that 
there may be an aggregate effect, at least for a few years [3]. 
A prominent case of a large trade shock with labor market implications is the spectacular 
growth of Chinese exports over the 1990–2010 period. The “China shock” caused extensive 
job losses in import-competing industries in the US and other high-wage countries [4]. 
The neoclassical precept that general equilibrium forces would render a trade shock 
short-lived, is based on the mechanisms of wage and price arbitrage, and labor mobility. 
These mechanisms would dissipate a local shock nationally, but they have not completely 
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mitigated the China shock in the US. The adverse employment effects of the China shock 
were concentrated in manufacturing sectors and in the regions where manufacturing 
firms locate, were long-lasting and did not dissipate nationally through the reallocation of 
displaced workers. In aggregate, however, the jobs created by the concomitant expansion 
of exports to both China and the rest of the world, in sectors not exposed to import 
competition, more than offset the reduction in manufacturing jobs [5].
The key questions for the aggregate outcome, therefore, are not whether import 
competition destroys jobs in the affected sectors, but whether the associated increase 
in exports creates a corresponding number of jobs over a reasonable timescale (either 
for displaced workers or new ones) and whether this is accomplished without significant 
reductions in wages. 
Reemploying displaced workers
The recent evidence from the China shock, as well as other trade liberalization episodes, 
suggests that labor markets adjust to trade changes very slowly. Imperfect labor mobility 
across jobs ties workers’ outcomes to their initial industry and region of employment, and 
implies long-term negative consequences on both employment and earning trajectories of 
displaced workers [4]. The experience of job displacement, however, varies in important 
ways depending on workers’ skill levels and education and the industry-specificity of 
their human capital. Initially, trade shocks seem to affect all workers similarly, but 
subsequently, being able to move out of the trade-affected sector is important, not least 
to avoid being hit by further import shocks. High-wage workers seem better able to do 
so than low-wage workers. Trade induced adjustment problems, finally, do not end when 
workers find jobs in growing sectors, but persist for those who lose a substantial part 
of their human capital in the new environment [6]. Human capital specific to the initial 
Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin comparative advantage
Comparative advantage is the idea that countries will export goods which they can 
produce relatively more cheaply than their partners and import those in which their costs 
are relatively greater (with, possibly, a band of non-traded products in between). The 
theory was formulated by David Ricardo in 1817 in On the Principles of Political Economy and 
Taxation. In his exposition of trade between England and Portugal the differences in relative 
costs arose from the two countries having different patterns of labor productivity across 
industries. In modern usage, the term “Ricardian comparative advantage” is applied 
to any circumstance in which costs differences arise from technological differences in 
productivity patterns regardless of which factor the differences reside in. 
The alternative view of Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin postulates that technology is 
the same in all countries, but that countries differ in the proportions with which they 
are endowed with different factors of production. If goods require different factors in 
different proportions from each other, Heckscher and Ohlin were able to show that, 
say, a good requiring relatively more labor would be relatively cheaper in a more labor-
abundant country in the absence of trade and this would become an export when 
trade occurred. The term Heckscher-Ohlin comparative advantage is used whenever 
the differences in relative costs are postulated to stem from countries’ different 
endowments of factors. 
Ricardo, D. On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. London: John Murray, 1817.
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industry, in particular to manufacturing, is the main determinant of workers’ adjustment 
cost to an import shock. 
Ultimately, however, the fate of displaced workers is in the hands of labor market 
institutions. In countries with active labor market policies, such as Denmark, trade shocks 
cause workers to move out of the trade-affected sectors and to seek further education, 
thereby potentially upgrading the supply of skill [6]. In Brazil, some of the trade-displaced 
workers from the formal sector are eventually absorbed by the informal sector, after years 
spent in non-employment [7]. In South Africa, a country with high unemployment rates, a 
small informal sector, and strong wage rigidity due to trade unions, workers displaced by 
trade liberalization saw an increased probability of becoming discouraged searchers (not 
actively searching but willing to work) or of exiting the labor force entirely (no longer willing 
to work) [8]. 
Hitting poor countries
There is no compelling evidence that trade liberalization disproportionately hits the weak 
and the poor in developing countries. First, workers at lower levels of education appear to 
be disadvantaged when coping with trade-induced displacement regardless of countries’ 
levels of development. Second, there are also cases where trade liberalization has produced 
more or less equal employment effects across all education levels, but worse effects for 
black/colored workers among the low-skilled ones, such as in the case of South Africa. 
Increasing openness 
In contrast to the pessimism emerging in the research on the China shock, a macroeconomic 
study shows that increasing openness lay behind much of the dramatic decline in the 
natural rate of unemployment in Singapore [9]. Introducing wage bargaining and trade 
unions into a specific-factors two-sector economy endogenizes the natural rate of 
unemployment. Between 1966 and 2000—when the openness ratio (the sum of export 
and import relative to gross domestic product (GDP)) increased from about two to nearly 
three—the relative prices of export goods increased, and there was a rapid accumulation 
of capital in the export sector. Both phenomena increased the marginal product (and, 
hence, the wage) of labor in terms of non-tradable goods and services, and helped to 
expand overall employment fourfold (as the population doubled). 
The direct effects of the accumulation were larger than those of relative prices, although 
the latter, a natural consequence of trade liberalization, are arguably the key causal 
factor behind Singapore’s experience. Even if entrepreneurs invested first and then sought 
markets for their goods, as some have maintained, the home market could never have 
absorbed the increased quantities, so trade liberalization was the key to selling large 
quantities without having the price fall. 
Overall, the empirical results on trade policy and aggregate (un)employment suggest 
little systematic effect [10]. But there is a tendency for studies relating openness to 
employment to find a positive relationship between them.
Sectoral employment 
Many sectoral studies show that protection for import-competing sectors or export 
booms for exportable sectors are associated with increases in employment. Translating 
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this into broad-based trade liberalizations that boost both imports and exports would 
suggest reallocations of labor from the importable to the exportable sectors. Mauritius, 
during its period of industrialization, 1971–1991, offers some support for this view. 
Exportable sectors gained employment (and wages), but importable sectors did also, 
despite the reduction in trade barriers appearing to open them to greater competition. 
The latter fact can be attributed to the general equilibrium effects of liberalization (and 
other policies fostering industrialization), which caused the economy to expand strongly. 
Similar results are found elsewhere for several countries—such as Vietnam.
A less optimistic scenario has been found for Brazil’s trade liberalization of the 1990s 
[7]. The tariff cuts on final goods displaced workers from import-competing sectors, 
but exporters failed to absorb these workers, even though they expanded their output. 
The employment losses in tradable sectors were partially offset by transitions into non-
tradable employment, although not enough to avoid some workers transitioning into 
unemployment and eventually into informal employment. 
Sectoral reallocation
For developing countries, it is perfectly plausible that both export- and import-competing 
sectors expand with trade liberalization: industrialization draws workers out of low-level 
subsistence agriculture and into measurable employment in more easily observed and often 
more formal sectors. At least at first, this transfer is not curtailed by wage increases. For 
countries that have already passed the surplus labor stage of development, by contrast, the 
predicted reallocation, coupled with fairly stationary aggregate employment, is more likely. 
Worker migration in response to labor market shocks is very modest, and so it makes 
sense to expect most sectoral reallocations to be at the level of the local labor market. 
Unlike the previous literature, recent research on the impact of the China shock on the 
local labor markets in high-wage economies does, indeed, show evidence of sectoral 
reallocation. US imports from China caused job losses in tradable sectors exposed to 
import competition. These losses, however, were largely offset by US exports to the rest 
of the world, which created jobs in non-exposed and non-tradable sectors [5]. This 
latter result can be explained by the increasing number of non-manufacturing jobs in 
(former) manufacturing firms, driven by high-skill service professions such as design 
and engineering, or by increased marketing or other management services replacing the 
physical manipulation of material inputs. 
By contrast, trade liberalizations in middle-income countries show much less evidence of 
sectoral reallocation. The transitions observed are not from import-competing into export-
growing sectors, but rather into low-wage service or informal sectors, which are widely 
perceived as lower quality jobs. These results are a direct challenge to the neoclassical 
view that the benefits of trade derive from shrinking import-competing production and 
expanding exportable production. They are explicable by the low geographical mobility of 
workers, which implies that even if long-term aggregate employment appears unaffected 
by trade policies, the adjustment process is most likely to be accompanied by a long and 
painful adjustment process at the level of individual workers (as noted above).
Of course, liberalizations vary in depth, nature, and context, so expectations of finding 
an ostensibly single uniform effect should not be too high! Did countries with greater 
labor market flexibility have greater reallocations? Apparently not [11]. But the active 
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pursuit of policies to encourage intersectoral mobility was effective in achieving greater 
reallocation. Thus, while the failure of the simple theory about trade merely shifting 
resources between sectors and no more should certainly be noted, it is not clear that the 
theory’s basic insights are flawed. 
Intrasectoral reallocations and skill intensity
Recent theory and empirical work by international trade scholars has started to explore 
intrasectoral responses to trade reforms, which seems to be a perfectly natural outcome 
once it is recognized that firms differ—firm heterogeneity, in the language of trade 
scholars. Reallocations of labor occur from weaker to stronger firms, often accompanied 
by the latter’s increased investment, higher productivity growth, and more diligent 
search for better labor. This allows strong growth in sectoral output without significant 
increases in sectoral employment. The analysis has also suggested that these interfirm 
but intrasectoral reallocations are frequently associated with an increased demand for 
skilled labor relative to unskilled labor. 
A seminal study of Mexican firms shows that the export boom that followed the peso 
devaluation of 1994 induced stronger firms to improve the quality of their products and 
their workforces, and to pay higher wages [12]. In this study, as in many others, this effect 
was used to explain the widening skill premium rather than employment levels, but the 
basic insight clearly translates to employment. 
Another study assesses the impact of the creation of a customs union, MERCOSUR, 
on Argentinean firms [13]. In a model where firms choose between two production 
technologies that differ in their skill intensity there are three types of firm in equilibrium: 
the skill-intensive exporters, the unskilled exporters, and the unskilled domestically 
oriented firms. A tariff reduction in an export market induces more firms to enter and 
upgrade to the skill-intensive technology, increasing the market share of more productive 
firms. The gains by these firms and their subsequent investment generate higher demand 
for skilled workers and increase the skill premium. This forces the least-productive firms 
to downgrade the skills they seek. Testing this model on Argentinean firm data and 
exploiting the differential reduction in Brazil’s tariffs across sectors shows that small 
firms downgraded skills, while larger firms upgraded them in response to Brazil’s tariff 
reduction. The net effect on the share of skilled labor is positive and implies that one-
third of the increase in the employment share of skilled labor in Argentina between 1992 
and 1996 was explained by the reduction in Brazil’s tariffs.
Note that the analysis looks at the reduction of protection in Argentina’s main export 
market, rather than in Argentina itself. But it is the nature of trade agreements such as 
MERCOSUR that in order to win concessions by partners, a country, Argentina in this 
case, has to offer to reduce its own protection. This will affect import-competing firms, 
and other results in the literature strongly suggest that increasing competition in these 
sectors will also tend to favor stronger over weaker firms, and skilled over unskilled labor. 
Informal labor
One issue that has attracted policy comment is whether trade liberalization leads to 
greater emphasis on informal rather than formal labor markets. The question is fraught 
with difficulties because one needs to have a clear idea about exactly what informality 
amounts to, which varies by country and study. 
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Some recent works shed light on the relation between trade policy and the distribution 
of labor between the formal and the informal sectors. Exploiting variation at the level of 
local labor markets, Brazil’s liberalization of the 1990s has been found to have caused 
larger increases in the share of informal workers in regions facing larger tariff reductions. 
This is a long-term effect, whereby the informal sector seems to have acted as a cushion 
to trade-displaced workers from the formal sector. A similar effect was not found in the 
case of South Africa, due to the higher rigidity of its labor market and the small size of its 
informal sector.
A positive export shock can, on the other side, induce a more efficient allocation of 
resources and spur transitions from the informal to the formal sector. The US-Vietnam 
Bilateral Trade Agreement led to large (virtually unilateral) reductions in US tariffs on 
Vietnamese exports which, in turn, led to an increase in the share of formally employed 
workers in Vietnam [14]. These results are consistent with models predicting intrasectoral 
reallocations, from less to more productive firms, from shocks which increase aggregate 
wages: in Vietnam the within-industry effects were largest in manufacturing, which 
experienced the largest tariff cuts. Younger workers and those in more internationally 
integrated provinces were the most likely to relocate, which is consistent with lower 
adjustment costs to trade shocks for workers with relatively lower mobility costs. 
LIMITATIONS AND GAPS
This analysis is limited by several factors. But it would be fallacious to conclude—from the 
fact that the conclusion that trade policy has little effect on employment has technical 
limitations—that the effect is therefore strong (and of whatever sign one prefers). It 
is still the case that the best efforts in theory and empirics lead to little expectation 
from international trade policy for aggregate employment. The limitations include the 
following: 
 y There is a danger that trade policy is influenced by labor market outcomes 
(endogeneity), and that that relationship gets mixed in with whatever influence trade 
policy has on the labor market.
 y Defining overall trade policy stances and aggregate employment presents challenges. 
For example, should skilled jobs be viewed differently from unskilled ones? 
 y The assessment of the overall impacts of trade and trade policy has rarely been 
extended to non-tradable (not directly exposed) sectors, which can suffer through 
general equilibrium effects. 
 y The external validity of the current literature is far from perfect. Episodes of trade 
policy change are heterogeneous and are likely to have heterogeneous effects on labor 
markets, with the latter being driven mostly by underling labor market institutions. 
SUMMARY AND POLICY ADVICE
The effects of major trade policy changes on aggregate employment are mixed, although 
there is evidence that, in the long term, trade liberalizations boost employment (at least in 
developing countries) and that more open economies have higher levels of employment, 
other things being equal. Indeed, one can identify cases where trade liberalizations have 
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been followed by very rapid growth in employment. The problem, of course, is that in these 
cases much more than just trade policy was altered, so attribution is inevitably cloudy. 
Protecting import-competing sectors can increase the number of jobs they offer—or at 
least reduce the rate of decline. But such protection, through its effects on the rest of the 
economy, is likely to reduce the jobs available in export-oriented sectors.
Trade policy is not an employment policy and should not be expected to have major effects 
on overall employment. When it does, the reason is that it interacts with distortions in 
labor markets, which vary from country to country and time to time. While the immediate 
effect of reducing trade barriers tends to be a rise in unemployment, the longer term sees 
the reversal of this rise and an eventual decline in unemployment. That is, adjustment 
takes time, but, at least in this dimension, offers positive returns in the long term.
The key questions for the aggregate outcome are not whether import competition destroys 
jobs in the affected sectors, but whether the associated increase in exports creates a 
corresponding number of jobs over a reasonable timescale (either for displaced workers 
or new ones) and whether this is accomplished without significant harm to wages. 
Many studies show that protection for import-competing sectors or export booms for 
exportable sectors are associated with increases in the affected sectors’ employment. 
Translating this into broad-based trade liberalizations that boost both imports and exports 
would suggest reallocations of labor from the former to the latter sectors. Trade reform 
does not appear to cause large reallocations of labor between sectors, but it may still cause 
intrasectoral reallocation from less to more efficient firms within sectors. Reallocations 
of labor occur from weaker to stronger firms, often accompanied by the latter’s increased 
investment, higher productivity growth, and more diligent search for better labor. 
The policy message is clear: do not expect international trade policy to have major or 
even possibly predictable effects on aggregate employment. Policymakers concerned 
about employment levels should think about the aggregate economic balance and labor 
market institutions, and not interfere with international trade. 
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